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1. Introduction 
In a recent Note in this Journal, Mooney, Hall, Donaldson and Gerard 
(1991) - hereafter MHDG - argue that almost all empirical work by 
economists on equity in the delivery of health care is misguided, because it is 
based on an inappropriate notion of equity: that persons m equal need of 
health care should be treated the same. The appropriate notion, argue 
MHDG, is that of ‘equality of access’. 
2. What do policy-makers really think? 
One of MHDG’s arguments is that equity goals in policy documents are 
almost always couched in terms of access rather than utilisation. As anyone 
who has consulted policy documents in this area knows, the picture is 
typically far murkier than MHDG imply. Le Grand (1982), for example, has 
argued convincingly that some British policy documents seem to imply a 
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commttment to equahty of treatment for those m equal need; others a 
commitment to equality of access; yet others a commrtment o equality of 
health Such ambivalence 1s not confined to Bntam. the same is true of 
several other OECD countries [van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten (1992)] 
and, one suspects, of at least some of the non-OECD countries m MHDG’s 
11st. 
Part of this ambivalence reflects, we conjecture, the fact that the drstmctton 
between ‘access’ and ‘utihsation’ which MHDG make, whilst perfectly logical, 
1s less sharp m the minds of policy-makers than MHDG would have us 
believe The notion of ‘access’, they argue, refers to the opportunities open to 
people and 1s best thought of m terms of the costs people incur m using 
health services. It 1s self-evident hat even d everyone enloys the same access 
to health care (1.e face the same costs of securing care), persons m equal 
need may end up consummg different amounts of care (and types of care), 
simply because then demand curves differ. That policy-makers who have 
been successful m ehmmatmg mequahties m access would regard such 
demand-led differences m utthsatron as of no consequence, as MHDG Imply, 
is far from self-evident. We conlecture that policy-makers would want to 
know the resons for the differing demand curves before they make their 
ludgement We suspect that differences in demand curves that are attnbu- 
table to differences m income would certainly be a matter for concern. 
MHDG might respond to this by saying that when they talk about ‘costs’, 
they mean costs m utility terms rather than m money terms, to the extent 
that differences m income are reflected m differences m the marginal utthty of 
income, differences m income would automattcally be picked up m their 
measure of access But what of differences m demand curves that reflect 
differences m educatton? Suppose that the poor have the same opportunities 
to receive preventive care as the rich, but have a lower take-up rate simply 
because they are not as well informed about health matters. Wouldn’t pohcy- 
makers be concerned7 
We suspect they would. It is surely no accident that though policy-makers 
talk about access to health care, pohcy measures are typically defined m 
terms of health care itself Ironically, Mooney and McGuire (1988) them- 
selves put the point rather well In the context of a discussion of RAWP m 
Britain, they remark ‘The pomt 1s that equity, as associated with government 
dtstrtbutlve pohctes, 1s not about equality of output with regard to health 
care. Ostensrbly, it IS concerned with equality of opportunity. Yet m reality, 
given the problem of reconcthng expenditure with opportunity, the policy 1s 
largely concerned with equality of inputs, albeit weighted by some proxy of 
need’ (p. 74, italics added.) Is the switch from access to health care itself 
really because of ‘the problem of reconcilmg expenditure with opportunity’ 
(whatever that may mean), or because policy-makers really mean ‘health 
care’ despite the fact they say ‘access’? We conlecture the latter. 
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It 1s also surely no accident that academics on both sides of the Atlantic 
who have set out to examme ‘access’ have without exception actually 
examined ‘utllisatlon’.’ It may well be that Mooney (1983) is right:: the 
authors of these studies are simply confused. But how can such confusion 
have persisted for so long? And amongst such eminent researchers? The list 
includes, after all, Rudolph Klein, a well-respected British social pohcy 
analyst, and Karen Davis, the American economist and former adviser to 
President Carter. At a recent conference on equity m health care orgamsed 
around an ongoing EC comparative project,’ Davis had a simple explana- 
tion of why the American research group preferred to refer to its study as a 
study of equality of access even though its methods were basically those 
outlined in Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Pacl (1991) m the United States 
there is and never has been any distmctlon drawn between the two concepts. 
3. Assessing the ‘superiority’ of rival distributive principles 
But MHDG do not rest then case just on what pohcy-makers appear to 
think. They also offer some arguments of principle as to why, in their view, 
equality of access 1s ‘superior’ to ‘equal treatment for equal need’. There 1s 
some unhappy mixmg of positive and normative propositions m their list on 
p. 478, but the @st of their argument seems to be this to insist on equal 
treatment for equal need m the presence of different demand functions 
implies that mdlvlduals’ preferences are to be ignored m health care, that 
medical practices for gven conditions would have to be standardlsed, and 
that uniform comphance would have to be enforced. MHDG’s obJection to 
all of this is that Ignoring preferences implies acceptance of the view that 
health care 1s a merit good and this would constitute ‘a radical departure 
from traditional welfare economics’. They proceed to examine what they 
claim to be the ‘theoretical underpmnmgs of eqmty by exammmg various 
models of altrulstlc externality 
Models of externality are, it has to be said, a red herring. They say 
nothing about equity and distributive Justice. Nor do they purport to As one 
of us [Culyer (1980)] argued long ago, there 1s a world of difference between 
what people regard as Just, and what they regard as desirable, even desirable 
to an altruist. The latter may depend on what they regard as just, but will 
certainly depend on their degree of compassion and on their economic 
situation. The whole point of making a Judgement about Justice IS, after all, 
to frame it in a way that it is a Judgement made mdepeudently of the 
interests of the person makmg it. That is precisely why Rawls (1972) and 
‘See, for example, Salkever (1975), Collms and Klein (1980), and PulFer (1986) 
‘Cf van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten (1992) 
96 A J Culyer et al, Utduatlon as a measure of equtty (Comment) 
phtlosophers since him have been so attached to the notion of the ‘vet1 of 
ignorance’, despite all its shortcomings. 
But what is especially surprising is MHDG’s apparent belief that because 
the notion of ‘equal treatment for equal need’ implies a departure from 
welfare economics, tt must automatically be inferior to the notion of ‘equality 
of access’ - a notion that doesn’t imply such a departure. This view 1s 
particularly surprtsmg m view of the importance MHDG attach to the 
revealed preferences of policy-makers. If there is one revealed preference 
‘expertment’ in health care whose results are unequivocal, tt is surely this: 
that, by going to such great lengths to sever the link between ability to pay 
and receipt of health care, policy-makers m most OECD countries and many 
others have signalled their unequivocal rejection of the traditional Paretian 
value judgements m the context of health care [cf Williams (1976)]. That 
‘equal treatment for equal need’ is inconsistent with such value judgements 
may, therefore, actually be a point in its favour rather than one against it, for 
it is at least a candidate, if not the only one, for what might supersede the 
Paretian value judgements 
A more appropriate question, then, IS not ‘Which distributive prmciple 
accords most closely to the value judgements of Paretian welfare economics7’ 
but rather ‘Which distributive principle appears to be considered most just? 
Glllon (1986) has considered the applicability of the vartous theories of social 
justtce to health care and concludes that of the various distributive principles 
‘dtstribution according to need’ commands the greatest support amongst 
physicians and others working in the medical field. 
‘Equal treatment for equal need’ also appears - at least on the face of it - 
to be consistent with a rejection of another value judgement of traditional 
welfare economtcs. that social welfare depends on, and only on, the utility 
levels of the various mdtvtduals who together make up ‘society’. Rejection of 
this 1s implied by the apparently widely held view amongst policy-makers 
that the busmess of health services is (primarily) improving health - a view 
that implies a commitment to what one of us [Culyer (1989)] has termed 
‘extra-welfarism’ rather than to the ‘welfarism’ of traditional welfare econ- 
omics [Sen (1979)]. Thts view is to be found m Britain, where Health 
Authorities m the NHS are now being charged with assessing the need for 
health care and of procuring appropriate packages of health care to meet 
these needs, as well as m the United States, where concern is frequently 
expressed about the failure to translate high per captta expenditures mto 
superior health outcomes 
In the extra-welfarist view, health care is merely a means to an end (viz. 
tmprovmg health) and the ethical justification of favouring one means of 
distributing health care rather than another (e.g. distribution according to 
need) has to be sought m the ethical justification of the associated 
dtstribution of health. The same 1s true of access, which in this view 1s also a 
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means to an end, the normative significance of which is that it enables people 
to receive health care, which in turn improves their health. Opting for one 
method of determming access (such as giving everyone the same access, or 
determining access in line with need) can also therefore be defended only m 
terms of the ethical justification of the final distribution of health it gives rise 
to. 
Adoption of the extra-welfare stance thus commits researchers to analysmg 
the fairness and efficiency of alternative distributional rules in terms of their 
implications for the distribution of the entity m which policy-makers are 
ultimately interested (which is, we conjecture, health), rather than in terms of 
how well the rules square with an inappropriate set of value judgements 
underlying modern welfare economics. Since it seems hard to justify aiming 
at a distribution of health other than equality (indeed the case for ‘distribu- 
tion according to need’ seems usually to have been that its adoption 
promotes equality), the analysis from an equity standpoint must inevitably 
involve asking the question ‘Which prmciple is most consistent with the 
pursuit of equality of health?. Clearly such an analysis requires a precise 
defimtion of ‘need’, as well as an appropriate analytical framework. Else- 
where two of us [Culyer and Wagstaff (1991)] have sought to do just this: we 
have suggested that need is best deftned as the amount of medical care 
expenditures required to reduce a person’s capacity to benefit to zero. If this 
is accepted, it can be quite easily demonstrated, however, that distributmg 
medical care expenditures according to need is, m general, unlzkely to 
promote equality of health and may well tncrease inequality. So, although 
being m need remains a necessary condition for the receipt of health care in 
an equitable system, allocation proportionately to need is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for equity m the distribution of health care 
Of course, the empirical literature that purports to examine ‘equal 
treatment for equal need’ does not m practice do this. Rather it seeks to 
establish the extent to which persons m equal health are treated similarly, 
which is a different principle from both equality of access and ‘equal 
treatment for equal need. But unless the scope for improvmg health via the 
application of medical expenditures is the same for the individuals concerned, 
the promotion of equality of health will require treating persons with the 
same health unequally 
4. Where does this leave ‘access’? 
This does not mean, of course, that adoption of ‘equality of access’ will 
necessarily be more successful m promoting equality of health than either 
‘equal treatment for equal need’ or ‘equal treatment for equal health’. Indeed, 
enough has been said to make it clear that the problem with distributive 
principles such as ‘distribution according to need’ and ‘distribution according 
98 A J Culyer et al, Vtdzsatlon as a measure ojeqwty (Comment) 
to mittal health’ 1s not that they entail dtscrimmatron amongst those who 
have gamed access to the health care sector, but rather that they discriminate 
mappropriately, failing to discriminate where they should, drscrimmating 
where they shouldn’t, and not dtscrrmmatmg enough where discrimination is 
required. Whilst ‘equality of access’ 1s almost certainly required in order that 
needs can be assessed, it is clear that rt IS not, m an extra-welfarist world, a 
sufjicient distributive principle Nor, indeed, IS rt a necessary principle m 
decisions concerning who should get what once needs have been assessed. 
Thus whilst we would not disagree with MHDG that measuring equality of 
access 1s an important item on the research agenda m this area, we would 
strongly disagree that such research IS all that IS required 
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